Operational Resilience had a Very Public Test on Friday

November 2026
•
Operations

Friday 13 November was a reminder of how dependent modern organisations have become on a relatively small number of technology platforms.

A global Microsoft outage disrupted Outlook, Teams, and other Microsoft 365 services for more than 24 hours. Downdetector logged more than 7.4 million outage reports worldwide, although these were reports rather than 7.4 million individual users. Microsoft ultimately attributed the disruption to a technical infrastructure issue and said it was not related to malicious cyber activity or AI.1,2‍

For organisations that rely heavily on email, calendars, collaboration tools, and cloud services, it became something of a Black Friday for business productivity.

The interesting question is not whether Microsoft, or any other major provider, should never experience an outage. No technology platform can reasonably be expected never to fail.

The more useful question is: How well can an organisation continue delivering important services when a critical supplier does fail?

The productivity impact was significant – but the final cost is unknown

It is too early to state a reliable total cost for the outage.

The productivity impact of a major technology disruption is not limited to the hours when a system is unavailable. It can include:

  • Employees unable to perform normal activities.
  • Customers unable to contact businesses or complete transactions.
  • Missed or delayed communications and decisions.
  • Manual workarounds and duplicated processing.
  • Backlogs created during the outage.
  • Overtime or additional effort once services recover.
  • Delayed settlements, claims, applications, or customer instructions.
  • Customer remediation where important services are interrupted.

The New Zealand experience illustrated the range of possible outcomes. Courts, property settlements, vehicle-related registrations, supermarkets, health services and government agencies reported impacts. Immigration New Zealand paused visa processing, while hospitals used alternatives such as phones, fax machines, and physical forms.  Importantly, Health New Zealand described the disruption to its services as minimal at that stage and reported no impact on patient safety.3,4‍

Operational resilience is not simply about whether a system goes down. It is about whether the organisation can deliver continuity of services and products while a key system is down.

Australia provides a useful comparison

Australian financial institutions are now operating under the current version of APRA’s CPS 230 Operational Risk Management standard.

CPS 230 applies across APRA regulated banks, general insurers, life insurers, private health insurers, and registrable superannuation entity licensees. The current standard commenced on 1 July 2026.5

It requires regulated entities to:

  • Effectively identify, assess, and manage operational risks.
  • Maintain critical operations within approved tolerance levels during severe disruptions.
  • Maintain credible business continuity plans tested against severe but plausible scenarios.
  • Understand the people, technology, information, facilities, and service providers needed to deliver critical operations.
  • Manage risks arising from material service providers.6

That is a useful lens to consider the Microsoft outage through.

The question is no longer simply:  “When will Microsoft restore the service?”

It becomes: “Which of our critical operations depend on Microsoft, how long can they tolerate disruption, what customer impacts arise, and what can we continue delivering while the service is unavailable?”

This is not solely an IT question.

It cuts across technology, people, operations, business continuity, third-party risk, customer outcomes, communications, incident management, and executive decision-making.

Reuters reported that Aviva had tested a similar-scale outage of its most critical technology systems about two weeks before the Microsoft incident. During the real outage, it used contingency arrangements including alternative telephone numbers and Bluetooth to transfer recordings while email was unavailable.7

That is a practical illustration of the difference between having a continuity plan on paper and having arrangements that people have tested and can actually use.

New Zealand is moving in the same direction

New Zealand’s operational-resilience environment is also maturing, although through several regulatory channels.

Under the CoFI licensing regime, in addition to maintaining effective fair conduct programmes,  licensed financial institutions are subject to standard conditions covering outsourcing, business continuity, and technology systems.

Condition 4 requires a financial institution that outsources a necessary system or process to be satisfied that the provider can perform to the standard required for the institution to meet its licence obligations.

Condition 5 requires:

  • A business continuity plan appropriate to the scale and scope of the institution’s services.
  • Operational resilience for critical technology systems.
  • Preservation of the confidentiality, integrity and availability of information and technology.
  • Business continuity and technology arrangements that support compliance with the institution’s fair conduct programme.
  • Notification to the FMA as soon as possible, and no later than 72 hours after discovering an event that materially impacts critical technology systems.8

This is directly relevant to fair customer outcomes.

With recent changes bringing consumer credit supervision under the remit of the FMCA market licencing regime, consumer credit lenders who weren’t subject to these standard licence conditions previously, will soon be.

A technology outage is not automatically a conduct breach. However, where an outage prevents customers from making payments, contacting their provider, progressing a claim or obtaining important information, operational resilience and fair treatment become closely connected.

Customers experience resilience through firms when they can still access essential services, receive accurate information and obtain appropriate support during disruption.

The Deposit Takers Act raises expectations further

The Reserve Bank of New Zealand is developing a more explicit prudential framework for operational resilience under the Deposit Takers Act 2023.

In 2026, the Reserve Bank consulted on a draft Operational Resilience Standard, a related draft Outsourcing Standard, and a proposed Critical Operations and Material Service Providers Register.9

The draft Operational Resilience Standard would require deposit takers to identify critical operations, establish tolerance levels, maintain a register of critical operations and material service providers, manage ICT and service-provider risks, and maintain business-continuity arrangements.10  

The draft is not yet final and remains subject to change. Expect to see similar requirements applied to Insurers under the proposed changes to the Insurance (Prudential Supervision) Act 2010.

This gives New Zealand deposit takers an opportunity to think beyond traditional disaster recovery.

Key questions include:

  • What are our genuinely critical operations?
  • What level and duration of disruption can customers reasonably tolerate?
  • Which people, information, technology and third parties support those operations?
  • Where do we have concentrations or single points of failure?
  • What happens when a major third party is unavailable but our own systems remain operational?
  • Can staff access instructions, customer information and contact details without their usual collaboration tools?
  • Have our workarounds been tested under realistic conditions?
  • Can we demonstrate that acceptable customer outcomes were maintained throughout the disruption?

The Microsoft outage provides a useful real-world scenario against which to test those questions.

Operational resilience should be a win-win

There can be a tendency to view operational resilience primarily as a regulatory compliance exercise.

That misses much of its practical value.

Effective resilience arrangements are intended to:

  • Maintain critical customer services during disruption.
  • Reduce avoidable downtime and operational confusion.
  • Give staff workable alternatives when normal systems are unavailable.
  • Limit the size of post-incident backlogs.
  • Improve management of technology and third-party dependencies.
  • Support clearer customer and stakeholder communications.
  • Enable faster and better-informed executive decisions.
  • Provide boards and regulators with evidence that important services can remain within tolerance.

Regulation cannot prevent the next Microsoft, cloud, telecommunications, or cyber incident.

But it can require institutions to understand their dependencies, establish tolerances, test credible scenarios, and prepare workable alternatives.

The objective is not to promise that nothing will fail.

It is to ensure that when something does fail, the organisation can continue delivering the services its customers genuinely need.

In conclusion

The Microsoft outage was an inconvenient and costly disruption for businesses and customers around the world. It was also a very public operational-resilience test.

For Australian regulated institutions operating under CPS 230, it provides an opportunity to assess whether critical operations genuinely remained within tolerance during a prolonged third-party technology disruption.

For New Zealand financial institutions, the direction is increasingly clear. CoFI and other market service licence conditions already connect outsourcing, continuity, technology resilience, and fair treatment. The Deposit Takers Act will introduce a more explicit prudential operational-resilience framework, although the current standard remains in draft. IPSA reform may enable a broader range of insurer standards, with detailed content not yet to be decided but likely including more prescriptive operational resilience standards.

The goal should not simply be regulatory compliance.

It should be ensuring that when the next major disruption occurs, customers can still access essential services, and financial institutions can continue operating effectively.

That is a win for customers, regulators, and financial institutions.

Mosaic has a range of experts who have experience in practically applying operational resilience, CPS 230 or the developing New Zealand regulatory environment. If this is something that is top of mind, I would love to chat. Feel free to reach out.

Sources:

  1. reuters.com
  2. ‍abc.net.au
  3. newstalkzb.co.nz
  4. ‍thepost.co.nz
  5. apra.gov.au
  6. apra.gov.au
  7. reuters.com‍
  8. fma.govt.nz‍
  9. consultati...nz.govt.nz
  10. consultati...nz.govt.nz

Operational Resilience had a Very Public Test on Friday

Published
November 2026
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Friday 13 November was a reminder of how dependent modern organisations have become on a relatively small number of technology platforms.

A global Microsoft outage disrupted Outlook, Teams, and other Microsoft 365 services for more than 24 hours. Downdetector logged more than 7.4 million outage reports worldwide, although these were reports rather than 7.4 million individual users. Microsoft ultimately attributed the disruption to a technical infrastructure issue and said it was not related to malicious cyber activity or AI.1,2‍

For organisations that rely heavily on email, calendars, collaboration tools, and cloud services, it became something of a Black Friday for business productivity.

The interesting question is not whether Microsoft, or any other major provider, should never experience an outage. No technology platform can reasonably be expected never to fail.

The more useful question is: How well can an organisation continue delivering important services when a critical supplier does fail?

The productivity impact was significant – but the final cost is unknown

It is too early to state a reliable total cost for the outage.

The productivity impact of a major technology disruption is not limited to the hours when a system is unavailable. It can include:

  • Employees unable to perform normal activities.
  • Customers unable to contact businesses or complete transactions.
  • Missed or delayed communications and decisions.
  • Manual workarounds and duplicated processing.
  • Backlogs created during the outage.
  • Overtime or additional effort once services recover.
  • Delayed settlements, claims, applications, or customer instructions.
  • Customer remediation where important services are interrupted.

The New Zealand experience illustrated the range of possible outcomes. Courts, property settlements, vehicle-related registrations, supermarkets, health services and government agencies reported impacts. Immigration New Zealand paused visa processing, while hospitals used alternatives such as phones, fax machines, and physical forms.  Importantly, Health New Zealand described the disruption to its services as minimal at that stage and reported no impact on patient safety.3,4‍

Operational resilience is not simply about whether a system goes down. It is about whether the organisation can deliver continuity of services and products while a key system is down.

Australia provides a useful comparison

Australian financial institutions are now operating under the current version of APRA’s CPS 230 Operational Risk Management standard.

CPS 230 applies across APRA regulated banks, general insurers, life insurers, private health insurers, and registrable superannuation entity licensees. The current standard commenced on 1 July 2026.5

It requires regulated entities to:

  • Effectively identify, assess, and manage operational risks.
  • Maintain critical operations within approved tolerance levels during severe disruptions.
  • Maintain credible business continuity plans tested against severe but plausible scenarios.
  • Understand the people, technology, information, facilities, and service providers needed to deliver critical operations.
  • Manage risks arising from material service providers.6

That is a useful lens to consider the Microsoft outage through.

The question is no longer simply:  “When will Microsoft restore the service?”

It becomes: “Which of our critical operations depend on Microsoft, how long can they tolerate disruption, what customer impacts arise, and what can we continue delivering while the service is unavailable?”

This is not solely an IT question.

It cuts across technology, people, operations, business continuity, third-party risk, customer outcomes, communications, incident management, and executive decision-making.

Reuters reported that Aviva had tested a similar-scale outage of its most critical technology systems about two weeks before the Microsoft incident. During the real outage, it used contingency arrangements including alternative telephone numbers and Bluetooth to transfer recordings while email was unavailable.7

That is a practical illustration of the difference between having a continuity plan on paper and having arrangements that people have tested and can actually use.

New Zealand is moving in the same direction

New Zealand’s operational-resilience environment is also maturing, although through several regulatory channels.

Under the CoFI licensing regime, in addition to maintaining effective fair conduct programmes,  licensed financial institutions are subject to standard conditions covering outsourcing, business continuity, and technology systems.

Condition 4 requires a financial institution that outsources a necessary system or process to be satisfied that the provider can perform to the standard required for the institution to meet its licence obligations.

Condition 5 requires:

  • A business continuity plan appropriate to the scale and scope of the institution’s services.
  • Operational resilience for critical technology systems.
  • Preservation of the confidentiality, integrity and availability of information and technology.
  • Business continuity and technology arrangements that support compliance with the institution’s fair conduct programme.
  • Notification to the FMA as soon as possible, and no later than 72 hours after discovering an event that materially impacts critical technology systems.8

This is directly relevant to fair customer outcomes.

With recent changes bringing consumer credit supervision under the remit of the FMCA market licencing regime, consumer credit lenders who weren’t subject to these standard licence conditions previously, will soon be.

A technology outage is not automatically a conduct breach. However, where an outage prevents customers from making payments, contacting their provider, progressing a claim or obtaining important information, operational resilience and fair treatment become closely connected.

Customers experience resilience through firms when they can still access essential services, receive accurate information and obtain appropriate support during disruption.

The Deposit Takers Act raises expectations further

The Reserve Bank of New Zealand is developing a more explicit prudential framework for operational resilience under the Deposit Takers Act 2023.

In 2026, the Reserve Bank consulted on a draft Operational Resilience Standard, a related draft Outsourcing Standard, and a proposed Critical Operations and Material Service Providers Register.9

The draft Operational Resilience Standard would require deposit takers to identify critical operations, establish tolerance levels, maintain a register of critical operations and material service providers, manage ICT and service-provider risks, and maintain business-continuity arrangements.10  

The draft is not yet final and remains subject to change. Expect to see similar requirements applied to Insurers under the proposed changes to the Insurance (Prudential Supervision) Act 2010.

This gives New Zealand deposit takers an opportunity to think beyond traditional disaster recovery.

Key questions include:

  • What are our genuinely critical operations?
  • What level and duration of disruption can customers reasonably tolerate?
  • Which people, information, technology and third parties support those operations?
  • Where do we have concentrations or single points of failure?
  • What happens when a major third party is unavailable but our own systems remain operational?
  • Can staff access instructions, customer information and contact details without their usual collaboration tools?
  • Have our workarounds been tested under realistic conditions?
  • Can we demonstrate that acceptable customer outcomes were maintained throughout the disruption?

The Microsoft outage provides a useful real-world scenario against which to test those questions.

Operational resilience should be a win-win

There can be a tendency to view operational resilience primarily as a regulatory compliance exercise.

That misses much of its practical value.

Effective resilience arrangements are intended to:

  • Maintain critical customer services during disruption.
  • Reduce avoidable downtime and operational confusion.
  • Give staff workable alternatives when normal systems are unavailable.
  • Limit the size of post-incident backlogs.
  • Improve management of technology and third-party dependencies.
  • Support clearer customer and stakeholder communications.
  • Enable faster and better-informed executive decisions.
  • Provide boards and regulators with evidence that important services can remain within tolerance.

Regulation cannot prevent the next Microsoft, cloud, telecommunications, or cyber incident.

But it can require institutions to understand their dependencies, establish tolerances, test credible scenarios, and prepare workable alternatives.

The objective is not to promise that nothing will fail.

It is to ensure that when something does fail, the organisation can continue delivering the services its customers genuinely need.

In conclusion

The Microsoft outage was an inconvenient and costly disruption for businesses and customers around the world. It was also a very public operational-resilience test.

For Australian regulated institutions operating under CPS 230, it provides an opportunity to assess whether critical operations genuinely remained within tolerance during a prolonged third-party technology disruption.

For New Zealand financial institutions, the direction is increasingly clear. CoFI and other market service licence conditions already connect outsourcing, continuity, technology resilience, and fair treatment. The Deposit Takers Act will introduce a more explicit prudential operational-resilience framework, although the current standard remains in draft. IPSA reform may enable a broader range of insurer standards, with detailed content not yet to be decided but likely including more prescriptive operational resilience standards.

The goal should not simply be regulatory compliance.

It should be ensuring that when the next major disruption occurs, customers can still access essential services, and financial institutions can continue operating effectively.

That is a win for customers, regulators, and financial institutions.

Mosaic has a range of experts who have experience in practically applying operational resilience, CPS 230 or the developing New Zealand regulatory environment. If this is something that is top of mind, I would love to chat. Feel free to reach out.

Sources:

  1. reuters.com
  2. ‍abc.net.au
  3. newstalkzb.co.nz
  4. ‍thepost.co.nz
  5. apra.gov.au
  6. apra.gov.au
  7. reuters.com‍
  8. fma.govt.nz‍
  9. consultati...nz.govt.nz
  10. consultati...nz.govt.nz
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